

Synergising Network Analysis Tradecraft


Network Tradecraft Advancement Team
(NTAT)



Overview

* What is the NTAT?

* 2011 – 2012 work and accomplishments



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Tradecraft?

Tradecraft

- “The development of methods, techniques, algorithms and processes in order to generate Intelligence, and developing the ability to apply this knowledge either manually or through automation. Tradecraft is developed from experience, research, intuition and by the reapplication and redefinition of existing techniques. **Industrial-Scale Tradecraft** involves data on a large scale.”

Network Tradecraft

- Usable knowledge about how to acquire intelligence FROM the network^{kr}




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The NTAT

- * Create repeatable, sustainable & shareable tradecraft to enable network analysis
- * Facilitate knowledge collaboration and interchange across the 5-Eyes SIGDEV community



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The Process

Stage 1 = Fact Finding

Stage 2 = Define Focus (based on Fact Finding)

Stage 3 = Develop Tradecraft

Stage 4 = Document Tradecraft

Stage 5 = Test Documented Tradecraft and Refine

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Network Convergence Tradecraft

- * Technological convergence – where voice and data services interact with each other on a single device
- * Tradecraft to enable the targeting of handsets in telephony space and CNE exploitation in IP space
- * Improved algorithms for mobile gateway identification and implementation of these algorithms



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DSD Workshop November 2011

- * 2 weeks
 - * CSE, DSD, GCHQ
 - * Virtually, via chat room, NSA & GCSB
- * Focus on data, techniques & analytic outcomes

<https://wiki.dsd/twiki/> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DSD Workshop Outcomes

Technique developed to identify wide variety of potential converged data, unique for specific country or mobile network operator

- Ø ***potentially lead to convergence correlation dataset to help profile targets on-line activity***

Documentation of techniques to identify specific components of raw HTTP activity that alludes to the browsing, downloading and installation of smartphone applications

- Ø ***identified the presence of application servers for mobile network operators and geographical areas***

DSD implementation of mobile gateway identification analytic based on FRETING YETI

- Ø ***three agencies now running the same analytic provides a richer dataset of mobile gateways***

CRAFTY SHACK trial

- Ø ***NTAT now using CRAFTY SHACK for tradecraft documentation***

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XKS Microplugin: Samsung Protocol

Samsung Protocol														
Help Actions Reports View Map View FILTERS														
	State	ID	CSC	Device_Model	HTTP_User_Agent	Imei	Latest_Mcc	Mcc	Message_Id	Message_Type	Mnc	Network_Ty	Odc_Versio	Active User/
1		252	1KSA	GT-I7000	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2306-8	checkAppUpgrade Request	50	0	2.6.084	ES0HL0000000000
2		556	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		250		2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	ES0HL0000000000
3		548	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		250		2306-1	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	ES0HL0000000000
4		549	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		250		2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	ES0HL0000000000
5		1269	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		250		2306-3	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	ES0HL0000000000
6		1281	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		250		2306-4	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	ES0HL0000000000
7		1282	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		250		2306-5	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	ES0HL0000000000
8		1224	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		250		2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	20	0	2.6.148	ES0HL0000000000
9		1	1AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2350-0	getPushNotificationMessage Re	20	0		ES0HL0000000000
10		62	1SKZ	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2350-0	getPushNotificationMessage Re	20	0		ES0HL0000000000
11		432	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2309-0	getDownloadList Request	20	0		ES0HL0000000000
12		482	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2308-0	getKillList Request	20	0		ES0HL0000000000
13		1024	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2301-0	getUpgradeKillCount Request	20	0		ES0HL0000000000
14		786	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2301-0	getUpgradeKillCount Request	50	0		ES0HL0000000000
15		1110	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2309-0	getDownloadList Request	50	0		ES0HL0000000000
16		664	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2306-5	checkAppUpgrade Request	40	0	2.6.122	ES0HL0000000000
17		260	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2302-2	upgradeListEx Request	20	0	2.6.194	ES0HL0000000000
18		282	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2160-6	purchaseDetailEx Request	20	0	2.6.194	ES0HL0000000000
19		490	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2306-2	checkAppUpgrade Request	20	0	2.6.048	ES0HL0000000000
20		522	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2300-0	countrySearchEx Request	20	0		ES0HL0000000000
21		981	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412		2300-1	countrySearch Request	111	0		ES0HL0000000000
22		984	1THR	GT-B5512	SAMSUNG-Android		412		5060-1	termInformation Request	20	0	2.6.048	ES0HL0000000000
23		985	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412							
24		986	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412							
25		1259	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412							
26		1244	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412							
27		1509	1XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android		412							
28		54	TOP SECRET//SI//	2012-05-11 06:43:27	2012-05-11 06:43:27		412		2300-0	countrySearchEx Request	20	0		ES0HL0000000000
29		412	TOP SECRET//SI//	2012-05-13 02:32:35	2012-05-13 02:32:35		412		2300-1	countrySearch Request	111	0		ES0HL0000000000
30		488	TOP SECRET//SI//	2012-05-11 09:32:36	2012-05-11 09:32:36		412		5060-1	termInformation Request	20	0	2.6.048	ES0HL0000000000

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CSE Workshop February 2012

- * 2 weeks
 - * CSE, DSD, GCHQ, GCSB, NSA – everyone wanted to experience a Canadian winter!
 - * Build on the work started at DSD



Winter Nirvana



The Reality!



CSE Workshop Outcomes

Refinement of XKS fingerprints to identify mobile bearers, Samsung and Android Marketplace servers

Ø *17 XKS fingerprints deployed*

Documentation of analytics in CRAFTY SHACK

Ø *These analytics are now being implemented across the 5 Eyes*

Proving the tradecraft actually works!

Ø *Scenario to test the tradecraft and analytics – Op IRRITANT HORN*

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Op IRRITANT HORN



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Op IRRITANT HORN


Does the tradecraft work?

- * Another Arab Spring (only this time, different countries)
- * Goal: identify aggregation points for the mobile networks in the countries of interest using the tradecraft developed during the workshops
- * Did it work? YES -> the team was able to identify connections from the countries to application and vendor servers in non 5-Eyes countries
- * So what? We found some servers....
 - Ø Potential MiTM
 - Ø Effects
 - Ø Harvesting data at rest
 - Ø Harvesting data in transit

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Finding mobile application & vendor update servers



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
Finding mobile application & vendor update servers



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
Identifying servers communicating with an MNO



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Profiling mobile application servers




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Profiling mobile application servers



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Success Stories

- * UCWeb mobile browser identification
 - * Discovered by GCHQ analyst during DSD workshop
- * Chinese mobile web browser – leaks IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI and device characteristics



UCWeb

- * Led to discovery of active comms channel from [REDACTED]

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The CONVERGENCE team helped discover an active communication channel originating from [REDACTED] that is associated with the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as they are known within the [REDACTED] hierarchy area of responsibility is for covert activities in Europe, North America, and South America. The customer [REDACTED] leveraged a **Convergence Discovery capability that enabled the discovery of a covert channel associated with smart phone browser activity in passive collection.** The covert channel originates from users who use UCBrowser (mobile phone compact web browser). **The covert channel leaks the IMSI, MSISDN, Device Characteristics, and IMEI back to server(s) in [REDACTED]** Initial investigation has determined that perhaps malware can be associated when the covert channel is established. [REDACTED] covert exfil activity identifies SIGINT opportunity where potentially none may have existed before. Target offices that have access to X KEYSCOPE can search within this type of traffic based on their IMSI or IMEI to determine target presence

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UCWeb – XKS Microplugin

UCWeb													
Help Actions Reports View Map View													
	State	ID	Datetime	Highlights	Datetime End	Browser Version	Email Address	Handset Model	IMEI	MSI	Global Title	Platform	Active User/7
1	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2012-05-13 02:29:20		2012-05-13 02:29:23	8.0.3.107	@123movies	nokiae90-1			9379900100	java	E9DHL00000M0000
2	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	2012-05-13 06:00:59		2012-05-13 06:01:00	8.0.3.107	@123movies	nokiae90-1			9379900100	java	E9DHL00000M0000
3	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	2012-05-13 19:39:11		2012-05-13 19:39:11	7.9.3.103		HTC A510e				android	E9BDE00000M0000
4	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	2012-05-14 12:29:53		2012-05-14 12:29:53	8.0.4.121	@dijgol	NokiaE72-1				sis	E9DHL00000M0000
5	<input type="checkbox"/>	5	2012-05-14 17:46:46		2012-05-14 17:46:46	8.0.4.121	@mobimasti	NokiaX6-00				sis	H5H125221450000
6	<input type="checkbox"/>	6	2012-05-15 18:28:19		2012-05-15 18:28:19	8.0.4.121	@mobimasti	NokiaX6-00			93781090013	sis	H5H125221450000
7	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	7	2012-05-15 20:02:58		2012-05-15 20:02:58	8.0.4.121	@mobimasti	NokiaX6-00			93781090013	sis	H5H125221450000

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Vision of Success

- * Shared convergence database with numerous different sources, methods & tradecraft feeding into it
- * Ultimately correlating telephony and Internet TDIs with some degree of confidence



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